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I. INTRODUCTION
“The Framers guarded against the future accumulation of monopoly power
in booksellers and publishers by authorizing Congress to vest copyrights
only in ‘Authors.’” 1
“Two Registers of Copyrights have observed that the 1976 revision of the
Copyright Act represented a break with the two-hundred-year-old tradition
that has identified copyright more closely with the publisher than with the
author.” 2
[1] History repeats itself. This is why we teach history and spend time
studying it, in an effort to avoid repeating our mistakes. An example of
this old adage at work appears to be surfacing in modern American
copyright law’s response to new copying and dissemination technologies.
Although the statement of the two Registers of Copyrights presented
∗

Thomas A. Mitchell received his Juris Doctor from Notre Dame Law School in 2005
and holds a B.B.A. in Management from Texas A&M University. This Note is dedicated
to Matt Arend, Elizabeth Gray, Bobby Jee, and Meredith Peterson; thank you all for
helping me throughout my law school experience.
1
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 n.5 (2003).
2
N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 496 n.3 (2001) (internal quotation omitted)
(emphasis added).
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above may have been correct in 1977, 3 it appears that the opposite trend is
taking place today – copyright is becoming more closely aligned with
publishers. The safeguards enacted to prevent publisher monopolization
of the rights to copy and distribute creative works are increasingly
neglected when determining the appropriate response of copyright to new
technologies. Recent bills, statutes, and court proceedings have all
contributed to publishers’ ability to obtain those monopolies over new
methods of copying and distributing. 4 Thus, American copyright law now
faces a fundamental question: do the lessons of history and the purposes
underlying American copyright law require greater limits on the control
given to publishers of creative works, either by stronger authors’ rights or
weaker copyrights in general? Or, are the public and authors best served
by recognizing the derivative benefits which flow to them when the
profitability of publishing is protected?
[2] To resolve this question, one must consider the intricate relationship
between publishers, authors, and the public. Publishers need authors to
provide them with works to copy and distribute, and they need the public
to purchase the copies. Authors need publishers to make copies and
disseminate their works and the public to create demand for those works.
The public needs authors to create works and publishers to provide them
with copies. Each party involved in copyright’s incentive system relies
upon the others, and each receives benefits when the others get benefits.
However, each also has interests of its own. Publishers are business that
want to maximize their profits, so they want to give the least possible
remuneration to authors (taking into account what is practical given the
royalties offered by competitors and the desire to attract the author again
in the future) and charge as much as possible for each copy to the public.
Authors want to receive as much compensation for their work as possible,
so they too want the highest possible price from the public, but they want
high royalties and payments from publishers. The public wants creative
works at the lowest possible price, and therefore wants both publishers and
authors to get less payment for each copy. Each party has incentives to
both promote and curtail the interests of the others. Thus, the challenge of
3

See id. at 495-96 & n.3.
For convenience, the term “publishers” will be used throughout this Note to refer to the
publishing and distribution industries, including, in particular, book publishers and the
music industry.
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copyright law is to balance these conflicting interests while providing
adequate incentives to each group. 5
[3] This Note will show that, despite the constitutional mandate to the
contrary, 6 current law has shifted the balance of copyright’s incentives too
far in favor of publishers and away from authors and the public. 7 This
shift has occurred because of the relative concentration of publishers in
comparison with the other groups, 8 which provides publishers the ability
to purchase copyright ownership from authors. 9 This ownership, in turn,
provides leverage over any new technology related to copying or
distributing creative works. Using this leverage, publishers work to either
proscribe or control these new technologies. In this way, publishers are
able to maximize their own interests, while providing only the minimal
incentives necessary to both authors and the public. The balance shifts
from one of equality between the three interested groups to one favoring
publishers over the others. This problem is further compounded by the
effect of this shift on the new technologies and their creators. Copyright
5

See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 31 (rev. ed. 2003). This challenge was even addressed by the Statute of Anne
in 1710, which attempted to balance the interests of encouraging learning, the demands of
publishers, the demands of authors, and the public interest. GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 11-12 (2d ed. 2002).
6
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Thomas A. Mitchell, Note, Undermining the
Initial Allocation of Rights: Copyright versus Contract and the Burden of Proof, 27
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 525, 538 (2005).
7
This discussion is a gross oversimplification of the incentive structure between authors,
publishers, and the public. This structure is incredibly complex and nuanced, as none of
the three groups have just one set of incentives; for example, amongst authors, there are
numerous categories that each have their own incentives – writers, composers, singers,
actors, playwrights, etc. Even within each of these groups, no two people will be
motivated by the same exact desires and incentives. For purposes of this Note, however,
the general structure provided in the following paragraph will suffice to show the
underlying problems and how the proposed solution would rectify them.
8
See Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 4445 (2002) (“[A]n increasingly concentrated industry of publishers routinely own the
copyright for a work outright and therefore have an incentive to lobby for ever-expanding
copyright terms.”).
9
See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218 (1990) (“It not infrequently happens that the
author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum.”)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 14 (1909)); see also Mitchell, supra note 6, at 539-41
(discussing the ability of publishers to require authors to transfer their entire copyrights
before publication).
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law must account not only for the existing players, but also for new
authors and new types of works– such as creators of new inventions.
When a new technology is prohibited in its infancy or controlled by
publishers, both the authors of the technology and the public are harmed. 10
The American system of copyright law, however, was designed precisely
to avoid these outcomes.
[4] To demonstrate why the balance of copyright rights is important and
how to solve this problem and return copyright to an equilibrium point,
this Note will proceed in three parts. It will begin by exploring the origin
of the concept of “copyrights” and the purpose, rationale, and
development of American copyright law. It will then focus on the current
state of copyright law, which enables publishers to hold a monopoly over
the copying and distribution of creative works. Finally, it will present a
solution to this problem: the creation of a new right in the bundle of
copyrights for each new copying or dissemination technology created, and
the vesting of the right in the original author of each work, not the
copyright owner. 11
II. ORIGIN OF “COPYRIGHTS” AND THE AMERICAN COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
[5] A proper understanding of the way copyright law should respond to
the development of new technologies to maintain an appropriate balance
between authors, publishers, and the public can only be achieved when
considered through the lens of a full understanding and appreciation of the
purpose(s) underlying copyrights. This understanding, in turn, requires
some background knowledge of how copyrights developed and how and in
what context the American system of copyright was created. To that end,
this section will provide a brief overview of the origin of copyright law in
England, of the Copyright Clause in the United States, and of the purpose
behind American copyright law.

10

These authors are harmed because they lose control over, and potential remuneration
from, their inventions. The public is harmed because it loses the benefits the new
technology provides. Both are also harmed by the discouraging effect on creation and
invention and the loss of systemic knowledge (new technologies generally build up and
improve, or are inspired by, existing technologies).
11
This solution will be provided in much greater detail in the final section. See infra §
IV.
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A. The Origin of Copyrights
[6] Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press in 1436 12 provided the
original impetus for copyrights. The printing press was brought to Great
Britain in 1476, by William Caxton. 13 At this point, a great proliferation
in the number of books available in England began, along with a vast
increase in the number of publishers. 14 At the same time, however, there
was a rise in the incidence of piracy. 15 Unauthorized copies of books
created a problem for legitimate publishers. 16 In response, the Stationers’
Company, a guild for publishers, printers, bookbinders, and booksellers,
began granting rights to individual publishers to make copies of certain
manuscripts. 17 At the same time, the Crown was attempting to enforce
censorship of works antithetical to the Crown or to the established
religion. 18 To facilitate the enforcement of this censorship, the Crown in
1538 licensed rights to make copies to certain publishers, who were then
responsible for enforcing censorship. 19 Later, in 1557, the Crown granted
a charter to the Stationers’ Company, providing a monopoly on publishing
and printing in Great Britain. 20 Because the purpose motivating this
charter was merely to enforce censorship, there was nothing within the
grant to prevent the Stationers’ Company from enforcing its conferral of
the rights to make copy (or copyrights) on individual publishers, and it
was given the authority to do just that. 21 Thus, the original purpose
behind the first copyrights was to protect publishers, so they could keep

12

See EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 9 (1980).
13
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1968).
14
See PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 9.
15
See id.
16
See id.
17
Id. at 11; JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR’S DUE 28 (2002).
18
See PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 10.
19
See id. at 11; DAVIES, supra note 5, at 10; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 23-24.
20
See DAVIES, supra note 5, at 10; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 27-28; PLOMAN &
HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 11.
21
PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 11; cf. PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 21, 36
(“[C]ensorship did aid private persons, publishers and printers, in developing copyright in
their own interest with no interference from the courts and little from the government….
The Stationers’ Company was able to develop the concept of copyright because the
government remained indifferent to the private ownership of copy.”).
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the profits from piracy and enforce the censorship that was imposed by the
Crown. 22
B. Problems of Monopolization
[7] The initial system of copyright lasted for approximately 150 years. 23
The Crown allowed the licensing act to expire in 1694. By providing too
few copies of each work and charging exorbitant prices for each copy, the
publishers had become monopolists. 24 At this point, the Stationers’
Company (hereinafter “the Company”) still had the ability to grant rights
to individual members as against other members, but it had no
enforcement capability outside the courts. 25 Piracy became rampant. 26
The Company attempted to regain its enforcement rights, but the House of
Lords repeatedly denied these requests. 27
[8] After these failures by the Company, it changed tactics,28 and began
to press an authors’ rights theory of copyrights. 29 The Company argued
that without this protection, authors would suffer, because no one would
pay authors for their manuscripts. 30 In response to these efforts, 31 the
Statute of Anne, generally considered to be the first authors-rights
statute, 32 was created in 1710. 33
[9] The Statute of Anne was entitled “An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or
Purchasers of such Copies during the Times therein mentioned.” 34
Despite popular modern belief, the statute was not intended to protect
authors, it was intended to prevent piracy without allowing publishers to
22

DAVIES, supra note 5, at 10.
PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 11.
24
See id. at 12; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 32-33.
25
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 33.
26
See PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 12.
27
Id.
28
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 33.
29
Id. at 34; PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 13.
30
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34.
31
Id.
32
PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 12.
33
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); see also PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 43.
34
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
23

6

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XII, Issue 2

hold monopolies over works. 35 This is demonstrated in several provisions
of the statute. The statute did not restrict the ability to hold copyrights to
authors, it discussed piracy as printing copies of works “without the
Consent of the Authors or Proprietors of such” works, 36 and granted
rights to copy to authors or their “Assignee or Assignes.” 37 At the same
time, the intent to prevent piracy is clear from the grant of exclusive
printing rights to the author or his beneficiary. 38 The goal of preventing
monopolies was achieved by limiting the duration of these rights, which
had previously been infinite in duration. 39 For books which had
previously been printed, the owner of the printing rights was entitled to a
continuation of rights to print the book for twenty-one years, and the
author of any book not yet published, or his assignees, was entitled to the
exclusive publishing rights to such book for fourteen years from initial
publication. 40 Another major limitation on the ability of a publisher to
hold a monopoly on a work was the sole right granted exclusively to
authors, not their assignees, after the initial fourteen year term expired.41
The right to publish the work reverted to the author, provided that he was
still living, for another fourteen year period.42 Finally, as an additional
limitation on monopolization and a method of raising awareness of
creative works and increasing access to those works, penalties were not
enforceable unless the title of the book was “entered in the Register Book
of the Company of Stationers.” 43 Nine copies of each book also had to be
provided for the use of certain libraries. 44
[10] At first the statute had very little effect on authors because the
booksellers “simply insisted on having the copyright before they would
consent to publish a work.” 45 Furthermore, the successor to the
Stationers’ Company, the Conger, did not give up on retaining its
35

DAVIES, supra note 5, at 13; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 143.
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 152.
36
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publishing monopoly. 46 It owned the rights to numerous economically
lucrative works, such as Shakespeare’s works, and did not want the
copyright to fall into the public domain after twenty-one additional years,
it wanted to keep the rights in perpetuity. 47 If the Conger lost its exclusive
right to publish these works, it would face competition from other
publishers and the decreased profits which result from competition. 48
Therefore, the Conger continued to lobby the House of Lords to return its
former rights. 49 These pleas were denied. 50 The Conger then tried a new
strategy, based on a theory of common law rights of the author. 51 This
argument eventually led to the famous case of Donaldson v. Beckett. 52
[11] Prior to Donaldson v. Beckett, 53 Millar v. Taylor 54 had held in favor
of the argument of the Conger, stating that there was a common law right
of authors to copy their works which had survived the Statute of Anne. 55
This meant that publishers, who had acquired those rights from the
authors, held perpetual control over the copyrights in those works. 56
Moreover, the Millar case expanded the rights included in a “copyright”
from merely the publishing right to all rights in the work. 57 This appears
to have occurred from either an accident or a misunderstanding in the

46

Id. at 151.
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 32; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 152; PLOMAN &
HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 13.
48
See Norman W. Hawker, Maximum Resale Maintenance under the Rule of Reason, 51
BAYLOR L. REV. 441, 448 (1999) (“Competition tends to increase economic efficiency
and lower prices.”); Nicolas Oettinger, In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust
Litigation, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 325 (2001) (“Commentators often advance
economic efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust laws. Free
from the restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices, increases
production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business dealing.”).
49
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 153.
50
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 158.
51
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 35; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 158.
52
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38.
53
Id.
54
Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
55
Id.; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 36-37; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 168.
56
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 37; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 168-69. Interestingly,
the argument that the rights were perpetual was created by the publishers and was clearly
intended to benefit the publishers.
57
See PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 169, 170-171.
47
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case. 58 At the time, the term “publish,” when used in conjunction with
copyrights, referred to merely publishing rights, but the term “copy”
referred to all rights in the work. 59 The Millar court used the term “copy,”
and not “publish,” in its decision, and therefore the common law
copyrights recognized in the case subsumed all rights in a work. 60 Thus,
publishers who purchased an author’s copyright held all of the rights to the
work under a common law copyright theory.
[12] Alexander Donaldson disagreed with this result and proceeded to
publish the same work which had been at issue in Millar. 61 The protection
period established by the Statute of Anne had expired, so Donaldson
argued that the work was unprotected and could be published by anyone. 62
Beckett, who had purchased Millar’s rights to the work, argued that the
decision of the court in Millar was correct – the common law copyright
endured in perpetuity. 63 The chancery court in Donaldson v. Beckett held
for Beckett, based on the previous case. 64
[13] Donaldson appealed to the House of Lords, which held that the
Statute of Anne displaced the common law rights, and the work was
therefore free to be published by anyone. 65 In fact, “the decision could
hardly have been otherwise. It was the only decision which would destroy
the monopoly of the booksellers, and there is little question that the
decision was directly aimed at that monopoly.” 66 Therefore, the rights to
publish works were controlled exclusively by the Statute of Anne, and
these rights were of limited duration. 67 Finally, and “[u]nfortunately, the
decision does not seem to have been properly understood because of the
confusion surrounding the author’s so-called common-law copyright.” 68
Although the House of Lords explicitly “spoke in terms of the right of
58

Id. at 173; cf. id. at 172 (“Yet, in the light of the earlier history of copyright, all of the
opinions missed the basic point that copyright was essentially a publisher’s right.”).
59
See id. at 173.
60
PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 173.
61
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38.
62
PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 172.
63
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38-39
64
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38-39; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 172-73.
65
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 39; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 173-74.
66
PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 177-78.
67
See id. at 175.
68
Id. at 178.
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‘printing and publishing for sale,’” and not in terms of copying or
copyrights, the decision was interpreted, in light of the decision in Millar
regarding common law copyrights, to apply to all rights in a work, not just
the right to publish. 69 Thus, although the court had intended to address
only the publisher’s monopoly, it effectively determined the effect of the
Statute of Anne on the entire bundle of rights which compose a copyright.
Copyrights granted exclusive privileges to authors. These rights could be
transferred to publishers, but the rights were limited in important ways to
prevent monopoly power from discouraging the creation of new works.
C. American Copyright Law
[14] Approximately a decade later, twelve of the thirteen American
colonies had enacted some form of a copyright statute. 70 Most of these
were based on the Statute of Anne. 71 These statutes raised some
interesting points of their own, however. Eight of the statutes included
preambles stating that the purpose of copyright “was to secure profits to
the author; the reason for it was to encourage authors to produce and thus
to improve learning; and the theory upon which it was based was that of
the natural rights of the author.”72 A purpose of preventing monopoly is
conspicuously absent from this list. The concept, however, survived,
because of the basis of the statutes in the Statute of Anne. 73 Thus, the
state statutes were predominantly authors’ rights statutes, but they limited
the ability to gain monopoly power by including the limited duration
aspect of their English predecessor.
[15] This was the backdrop against which the Framers of the Constitution
developed the Copyright Clause. The Clause states: “The Congress shall
have the power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 74 This provision
provides the entire authority for the federal government to promulgate
69

PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 151, 173, 175; see also PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra
note 12, at 14.
70
PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 183-84; PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 14.
71
PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 183; PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 14.
72
PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 186.
73
Id. at 184, 188-89.
74
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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copyright laws. The purpose and intention of this provision sheds light on
who was to benefit from copyright, how they were to benefit, and what
copyright laws should and should not protect. Therefore, the purpose and
intent of this clause are important when attempting to determine how
Congress, courts, and publishers should react to the development of new
technologies.
[16] The way the Copyright Clause allocates and prioritizes incentives
amongst authors, publishers, and the public informs the propriety of
modern-day copyright statutes and protections. This purpose has been
extensively debated, with four prominent theories being asserted: “that
copyright is to protect the author’s rights; that copyright is to promote
learning; that copyright is to provide order in the book trade as a
government grant; and that copyright is to prevent harmful monopoly.” 75
Each of these theories has some support, and each theory can find some
historical basis during this period. 76 However, the generally accepted
understanding, that “the ultimate purpose of the Copyright Clause was to
promote learning,” 77 does not, by itself, tell us much about how to respond
to new publication and dissemination technologies.
[17] The methods of achieving this purpose are more instructive –
providing authors with incentives for their creative activities, and limiting
those incentives by time and function (to activities which promote
progress). 78 Both of these constraints limit the formation of monopolies.79
Giving rights to authors prevents monopolization by preventing the
concentration of power in any one person, because any one author would
only hold a limited number of copyrights, whereas a publisher can hold
vast quantities of copyrights. The limited duration of copyrights prevents
monopolies because the copyright eventually falls into the public domain,
so that anyone can freely use the work. In fact, the Framers even
75

PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 181; see also PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at
15.
76
See PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 181; see also Thomas A. Mitchell, Note, Copyright,
Congress, and Constitutionality: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Goes Too
Far, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115, 2121 (2004).
77
Mitchell, supra note 76, at 2125; see also PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 193; PLOMAN
& HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 16.
78
PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 194; PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 16.
79
PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 194.
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discussed the concept of monopolies within the context of copyrights. 80
Jefferson was hesitant to grant even limited monopolies over creative
works. Madison, an advocate of copyrights, only promoted providing a
limited monopoly to encourage authors to create, not plenary rights. 81
Thus, the ultimate beneficiary of the clause was to be the public, but the
method of providing public benefits prevented monopolies by giving
limited rights to authors.
[18] Finally, the inherent limitation on publisher monopolies is
demonstrated by the Act of 1790, 82 which was modeled after the Statute of
Anne. 83 The Act was entitled “An act for the encouragement of learning,
by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and
proprietors of such copies, during the times mentioned therein.” 84 The
Act is entitled similarly to the Statute of Anne, and it contains many of the
same restrictions and privileges as that statute, including a renewal
provision. 85 “In this way [regarding the renewal provision], Congress
attempted to give the author a second chance to control and benefit from
his work.” 86 This provision, allowing the author to regain control of his
work for a second term of copyright, actively prevents monopolization by
the publisher – just as had been done in the Statute of Anne. 87 Thus,
history makes clear that copyrights, although not explicitly intended to
prevent monopolies, effectively accomplished this result by establishing a
structure that balanced the incentives awarded to publishers, authors, and
the public. 88 This structure and balancing system should be maintained,
and the lessons provided by the early copyright system in England should

80

Mitchell, supra note 76, at 2122-23.
Id.
82
PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 16.
83
Copyright Act of 1790, 1 CONG. CH. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790); see Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 232 n.8 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The 1790 Act was patterned, in
many ways, after the Statute of Anne enacted in England in 1710.”).
84
Copyright Act of 1790, 1 CONG. CH. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
85
Compare Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.), with Copyright Act of 1790, 1
CONG. CH. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
86
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218 (1990).
87
See PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 197.
88
See id. at 194-96; cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201 n.5 (“The Framers guarded against the
future accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and publishers by authorizing
Congress to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”).
81
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not be forgotten. Publishers should not even be permitted, 89 let alone
helped and encouraged, to procure monopoly power through prohibiting or
acquiring control over newly invented copying and dissemination
technologies.
III. PUBLISHER PROTECTIONISM, CONTROL, AND NEW TECHNOLOGY
“It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a
publisher for a comparatively small sum.” 90
“Much of the existing copyright code is difficult to describe as a device
for providing incentives to create new works.” 91
[19] The history of copyright shows a system designed to limit monopoly
power by granting authors rights over publishers and by limiting those
rights. History also shows, however, that this preference was not
cultivated by authors or the public, but was created as a result of
arguments proffered by publishers. Thus, the underlying theory of
American copyright law, even the rights afforded to authors and the
public, developed as a result of a power struggle between established
publishers and challenger publishers (often referred to as “pirates”). 92
[20] Historically, challengers attempted to compete with the established
publishers by printing the same works in cheaper copies, either through
the same quality offered at lower price or by offering lower quality
copies. 93 The method created to prevent this struggle from resulting in
agreements between the challenger and established publishers to divide
the rights to remuneration from a work and reduce competition (a result
89

This does not mean that publishers should not enjoy profits from their efforts.
Publishers should be able to obtain remuneration for the work they perform. This
compensation for services should be limited to compensation for what they do, however,
and should not provide monopoly rents to them. Profits should be balanced between
publishers, authors, and the public, not distributed in the manner best seen fit by
publishers.
90
Stewart, 495 U.S. at 218 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 14 (1909)).
91
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279
(2004).
92
See generally id.
93
Id. at 293-95.
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which would ultimately harm consumers with higher prices and fewer
quantities of copies of works) was to give control of remuneration rights to
authors and limit the ability to control a work by limiting the duration of
the copyright (the source of control over the work). 94 However, this
solution was never totally effective, and the effectiveness it did have
declined as publishers grew in power and size. Thus, despite copyright
law’s purpose of promoting progress and benefiting the public by
rewarding authors (and therefore derivatively benefiting publishers),
copyright law has continued to develop in reaction to struggles between
established publishers and challengers, which normally arise with new
technological advances. 95 Worse yet, the effect of these reactionary
copyright laws has been to allow publishers to gain monopoly power, and
thereby to shift the status of copyright from a balance between authors,
publishers, and the public, to a preference for publishers.
A. The Power Struggle
[21] During the latter part of the nineteenth century and throughout the
twentieth, a number of new technologies were invented relating to the
business of publication and dissemination. 96 These inventions improved
copying and disseminating, by making it quicker, easier, or cheaper to
perform one or both of these activities, or some combination thereof. 97
Technologies such as record players, radio, and cable television presented
serious challenges to the incumbent industries (sheet music publishers,
sheet music publishers and songwriters, and the broadcast industry,
respectively), 98 and incumbent industries reacted negatively to the
upstarts. 99 They accused the new competitors of piracy and sought
protection. 100 Each incumbent group argued that the interests of authors
94

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Wu, supra note 91, at 292-325.
96
See id. at 292. Examples of this phenomenon include record players, cable television,
online music distribution, VCR players, DVD players, and audiocassette players.
Douglas Eberman, Popular Inventions - Everyday Household Items, Computers,
Transportation and Navigation, Medicine, Entertainment, Sports, Music, Art.,
http://douglas7eberman.net/techistory.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
97
See, e.g., Wu, supra note 91, at 293.
98
See id. at 297-312.
99
See id. The incumbent industries generally reacted by bringing lawsuits against these
upstart companies.
100
See id.
95
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would only be protected if the challenger was prohibited or controlled by
the incumbent – otherwise, authors would be prevented from receiving
adequate compensation for their works. 101 Furthermore, each incumbent
feared that the challenger would destroy and displace its business. 102
They brought actions in courts, accusing the challenger of copyright
infringement, 103 and sought legislative protection from Congress. 104 Each
of these conflicts resulted in a statutory grant of licensing in the form of
royalties. 105 More importantly, each of these conflicts resulted in the
incumbent industries successfully obtaining protection against challengers,
by requiring the challenger to pay royalties to the incumbent, and thereby
reducing competition from the challengers. 106 In this way, the incumbent
publishers leveraged their copyright ownership to obtain income from the
new technology, and the new technology was allowed to develop.
However, the challenger existed in relative harmony with the incumbent
instead of inciting competition between the two potential publishers to
obtain copyright ownership or licensing rights from authors, competition
which would have allowed authors to drive up prices for their works.
101

See id. at 298-99, 305, 313.
See id. at 297-312.
103
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974), superseded by statute, Copyright
Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), as recognized in Capital Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 641 (1984); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392
U.S. 390 (1968), superseded by statute, Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2000), as recognized in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 641 (1984); Herbert
v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917); White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1 (1908); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th
Cir. 1925); Alden-Rochell, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F.
Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901); Kennedy v.
McTammany, 33 F. 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888); see generally Wu, supra note 91, at 30124.
104
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (requiring license for making and distributing
phonorecords); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (giving
owners exclusive rights to their copyrighted works); see generally Wu, supra note 91.
105
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (secondary transmissions by
satellite); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (coin-operated phonorecord players); 17
U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (phonorecords); 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000) (sound recordings) 17
U.S.C. § 111 (2000) (secondary transmissions and cable systems); United States v. Am.
Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Wu,
supra note 91, at 290-91.
106
See Wu, supra note 91, at 325 (“Copyright cannot help creating the baseline for
competition among disseminators.”).
102
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B. Against Publisher Control: The Sony Case
[22] Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, publishing industries
utilized this methodology to great success. Nascent technologies were
generally either stifled in their incipiency or were at least controlled to
some extent by the incumbent publishers. In addition, two judicial
doctrines were created which made this process easier – contributory
infringement and vicarious liability. 107 These doctrines eased the burden
on the incumbents by making the manufacturer or operator of new
copying or distribution technologies liable for infringement activities of its
consumers or users, thereby allowing the copyright owner to sue one
party, the manufacturer or operator, rather than numerous parties, the
directly infringing consumers.
[23] Contributory liability creates liability in a secondary infringer when
three elements are present: “(1) direct infringement by a primary infringer,
(2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3) material contribution to the
infringement.” 108 Essentially, this doctrine imposes liability when the
party either knew or reasonably should have known that infringing activity
was occurring at a time when they had the ability to control or stop that
infringing activity. 109
[24] Vicarious liability also imposes liability for copyright infringement
on parties who did not engage in direct infringement when three elements
are present: “(1) direct infringement by a primary party, (2) a direct
financial benefit to the defendant, and (3) the right and ability to supervise
the infringers.” 110 All of this changed, however, and the incumbent
industries suffered a major setback, with the case of Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios. 111

107

See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160
(9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded by MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct.
2764 (2005).
108
Id.
109
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
110
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164.
111
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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[25] In Sony, the claim was not novel: Sony had developed a new
technology (the Betamax) which was capable of copying creative works,
and members of the movie and television industries alleged that Sony was
liable for copyright infringement. 112 These industries claimed that the
users of the VTR engaged in direct infringement, and that Sony was
therefore liable under the doctrine of contributory infringement. 113 The
Supreme Court, however, was hesitant to deny the benefit of new
technologies to non-infringing users merely to suppress infringing uses of
those technologies. 114 The Court rejected the contributory infringement
argument, holding that Sony was not liable because (1) Sony could not
control how the Betamax was used by consumers and (2) the Betamax was
“capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” 115 Thus, the Court rejected
the attack on the Betamax and refused to allow the movie industry to gain
any control over or prohibit it, because it could be used legitimately. Even
though Sony knew it was also used illegitimately, Sony had no way to stop
the infringing uses.
[26] This decision dealt a blow to the movie industry (the incumbent
publishers), because it meant that the industry could not go after Sony, the
manufacturer of the new technology, but instead was forced to go after
direct infringers, the consumers of its works. The Sony decision appeared
to impose significant burdens on the industry. Because the industry could
not extract payments from Sony, it would have to spend more resources
prosecuting infringers, risked alienating its consumers by suing them, and
faced competition in the market for producing copies of its works. Jack
Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America,
voiced these feared effects of new technology when he told Congress that
the VCR would destroy the movie industry. 116 He even went so far as to
say “the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public

112

Id. at 419-20.
Id. at 420.
114
See id. at 421, 431, 456.
115
Id. at 456.
116
Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R. 5705, 97th Cong. (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc.).
113
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as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.” 117 History has
vindicated the Sony Court’s decision, as the VCR not only did not destroy
the movie industry, but instead provided that industry with a source of
revenue that surpassed the revenues from box office sales within a few
years. 118
C. The Attack on Sony and Re-establishment of Publisher Control
1. Attacking Sony and the Rise of the Internet and the Digital Age
[27] Publishers have never been content with the Sony decision 119 and
have actively attempted to overturn the decision since it was handed
down. 120 These efforts were met with limited success for a number of
years, including the narrowing of Sony by numerous other court
decisions. 121 Despite these efforts, though, the holding still retains
117

Id.
An Examination of S. 2560, the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004:
Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004)
(testimony of Gary J. Shapiro on behalf of the Consumer Electronics Association and the
Home Recording Rights Coalition); Scott Huver, Are Hollywood Honchos Hiding Home
Video Profits?, HOLLYWOOD.COM, Aug. 29, 2002,
http://www.hollywood.com/news/detail/article/1113242 (discussing profits from home
video and DVD sales as “often twice as big as box-office grosses”).
119
See, e.g., Efforts to Curb Illegal Downloading Copyrighted Music: Hearing on S.
2560 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Gary J.
Shapiro, President, Consumer Electronics Association) (“S.2560 provides movie and
recording interests with the head-on attack on Betamax that they have long sought.”).
120
See id.; see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648-50 (7th Cir. 2003);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998-99 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom, Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox,
Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *22 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000);
Adobe Sys. Inc. v. S. Software, Inc., No. C 95-20710 RMW(PVT), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1941, at *26 n.16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1998); Nationwide Educ. Dev. Corp. v. Rex
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 4957 (JFK), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5331, at *13 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1990).
121
See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648-50 (7th Cir. 2003); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300
F. Supp. 2d 993, 998-99 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111
118
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viability as good precedent. 122 However, the creation and growth of the
Internet and digital technology have spurred a renewed and more
aggressive attack from the publishing industries.
[28] The combination of these two inventions, the Internet and digital
technology, has made mass distribution of perfect copies of works
possible, cheap, and efficient. 123 Furthermore, these inventions make it
feasible for individual users to engage in mass copying or distribution of
creative works, rather than restricting these activities to rival publishers
and challengers. 124 This poses a serious problem to publishers because
they receive no economic benefit from distribution or copying of works by
consumers. It is also a problem for authors, because it is difficult to
enforce royalty payments against such a large number of potential
distributors. Finally, it presents a long term problem for the public.
Although the public gets free copies of works in the short term, it
decreases the incentives of both publishers and authors to create and
provide new works, resulting in fewer available works in the future.
However, for these inventions to be effective, there must be a
manufacturer of digital copying equipment or an operator of an online
distribution forum. 125 To circumvent these problems and to avoid suing
F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom, Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
122
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th
Cir. 2004) (citing the Sony decision and relying on it as precedent), vacated and
remanded by MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-79 (2005) ("It is
enough to note that the Ninth Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of
Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be
required.").
123
See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 2115 n.2, 2116 n.3.
124
See id.
125
A centralized system, or at least a program that provides access to other users, is
necessary so that users have a place to search for the work they want to copy. See, e.g.,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d at 1159 (stating that
Kazaa uses a supernode structure that has composite lists on computers dubbed
“supernodes” and Grokster uses a de-cenentralized server which compiles lists of results
from searches on the user’s own computer); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at
646-47 (describing Aimster’s system as functioning like a stock exchange, because it
provides a forum for users to find and transfer digital files); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1011-12 (discussing Napster’s system as a central-indexing
model in which the server held no files, but it did keep lists of the files available from
users).
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their customers, publishers attempted to impose liability on the
manufacturers and operators of the new technologies or distribution
systems. 126
[29] The Sony decision, however, stood as a formidable obstacle to the
success of any suit against a manufacturer or operator of new technology.
According to Sony, no liability can attach to any manufacturer or operator
who employs a technology that is capable of substantial non-infringing use
and who cannot control the use of the technology by consumers. 127
Therefore, to avoid being forced to go after individual users by imposing
liability on the manufacturer or operator, publishers must either
demonstrate that the manufacturer or operator could control the uses of the
new technology or they must overturn or narrow the Sony decision.
[30] Publishers have pursued both of these avenues, achieving limited
success in each. First, publishers attempted to convince the judiciary to
overturn, or at least narrow, the Sony decision. 128 This effort met with
some success, with courts interpreting the holding to require that a new
technology be actually used for substantial non-infringing purposes, rather
than merely capable of these uses. 129 Thus, in In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, 130 the Seventh Circuit upheld an injunction against the Aimster
file-sharing service, because, in part, Aimster was unlikely to be able to
show substantial non-infringing uses of its service. 131
[31] Next, publishers achieved some success by arguing that operators of
new technology have control over the uses of that technology. 132 Two

126

See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 645-46; Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d at 435-36; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at
1010-11; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F.Supp.2d at 997; Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 303; RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc.,
No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 2000).
127
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446-47, 456.
128
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
129
See id. at 650-51 (“But the balancing of costs and benefits is necessary only in a case
in which substantial noninfringing uses, present or prospective, are demonstrated.”).
130
Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
131
Id. at 653.
132
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1159
(9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded by MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.
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prominent cases displaying these arguments are A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc. 133 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
Ltd. 134 In Napster, the Ninth Circuit ordered the Napster file sharing
service to remove all infringing files from its system. 135 When Napster
failed to comply with this order, the court ordered the service to be shut
down until compliance could be achieved. 136 Thus, the peer-to-peer file
sharing technology employed by Napster was prohibited for both
infringing and non-infringing uses and users. In Grokster, however, the
Ninth Circuit found that the defendant companies could not control the
uses of their file-sharing technology. 137 This technology was based on a
different system than Napster, a decentralized system whereby Grokster
was unable to prevent any particular files from being distributed. 138
Because of this lack of control, the Sony doctrine prevented the court from
finding Grokster liable. 139 In March of 2005, the recording industry
appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 140 In the Court’s view, the Ninth
Circuit “misapplied” Sony by reading that the case required that
“whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can
never be held contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use of
it….” 141 Instead the Court held that the case was “significantly different”
from Sony in that the distributors of Grokster, despite claiming
noninfringing, alternative uses, “show[ed] a purpose to cause and profit
from third-party acts of copyright infringement.” 142 The Grokster Court
Ct. 2764 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-12 (9th Cir.
2001).
133
239 F.3d at 1004.
134
380 F.3d at 1154.
135
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027.
136
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming the district court’s shut down order for failure to comply satisfactorily with the
district court’s preliminary injunction).
137
See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163-64 (holding that because the defendants were not
access providers, did not provide storage or maintenance, and only communicated with
users incidentally, their actions were “too incidental to any direct copyright infringement
to constitute material contribution”).
138
Id. at 1159-60, 1163-64.
139
Id. at 1167.
140
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
141
Id. at 2778.
142
Id. at 2782. In fact, Justice Breyer believed that “the need for modifying Sony (or for
interpreting Sony’s standard more strictly) has not been shown.” Id. at 2796 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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held that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting
acts of infringement by third parties.” 143 The Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit’s decision and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider
MGM’s summary judgment motion. 144
[32] Finally, publishers have lobbied Congress for a legislative reversal of
the Sony holding. 145 One bill in particular, the Inducing Infringement of
Copyrights Act of 2004, 146 was specifically introduced in an effort to
overturn the Sony decision. 147 This bill, if enacted, would impose liability
on any manufacturer or operator who encouraged consumers to commit
copyright infringement by means of advertising the capability of the
technology to perform infringement. 148 The Induce Act would have
specifically overruled Sony, because the Betamax was advertised 149 as
143

Id. at 2770.
Id. at 2783.
145
See, e.g., Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong.
(2004) [hereinafter Induce Act].
146
Id.
147
See, e.g., Letter from Ass’n of Am. Univ. et al., to Senators Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick
J. Leahy, Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept.
17, 2004), available at http://www.educause.edu/LibraryDetailPage/666?ID=CSD3471
(“The Copyright Office’s new draft fails to codify the Supreme Court’s Betamax
decision, which, despite having fostered twenty years of explosive growth in technology,
is now under unrelenting attack.”); Letter from Gary Shapiro, President of Consumer
Electronics Ass’n, et al., to Senators Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/10-6joint_letter_2.pdf (“Unfortunately, the
recording industry continues to propose language that would not solve the piracy
problems in the manner you identified, but instead would effectively put at risk all
consumer electronics, information technology products, and Internet Products and
services that aren’t designed to the industry’s liking.”); cf. 149 Cong. Rec. S7190 (daily
ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Of course, the dysfunctional corrective
mechanism that Sony proposed would have become problematic only if the Sony
limitation was misunderstood or misapplied by lower courts. Unfortunately, that has now
happened.”).
148
See Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004);
149 Cong. Rec. S7190 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Secondary
liability should focus on intent to use indirect means to achieve illegal ends.”).
149
Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
144
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being able to copy copyrighted works. 150 However, the bill was not
enacted when introduced in Congress in 2004. The pre-Grokster
consensus was that the bill would be re-introduced, with a greater
likelihood of passage, if the Supreme Court failed to overturn the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Grokster. 151 Now, publishers are taking a wait-andsee approach while the lower courts interpret the Supreme Court’s
Grokster ruling. 152 Although the Supreme Court sidestepped Sony, the
landmark case’s fate ultimately remains in the hands of Congress which
may decide to legislatively overturn the ruling.
2. Legislative Grants of Control to Publishers
[33] Publishers have also sought other methods of increasing their control
over creative works and preventing any rise in the level of competition in
copying or disseminating creative works. These efforts have generally
been in the form of lobbying Congress to create statutory protections for
copyrighted works. The success of these efforts can be demonstrated by

Liberties, and the Admin of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982)
(testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.)
(“Now, these machines are advertised for one purpose in life. Their only single mission,
their primary mission is to copy copyrighted material that belongs to other people.”).
150
If the bill were enacted, its breadth would depend on the interpretation given to it by
courts. What conduct is included is questionable at best. For example, car manufacturers
advertise their products as being able to accelerate from zero to sixty miles per hour and
as having top speeds above the speed limits. Would this constitute “inducement” of
speeding and reckless driving? The bill is so vague in its standards that it “has been
ridiculed by techies as so poorly written that it could unintentionally ban an infinite range
of everyday tools – iPods, DVD burners, even paper and pencil.” Xeni Jardin, Induce Act
Draws Support, Venom, WIRED.COM, Sept. 11, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1294,64723,00.html. See also Katie Dean, Big
Anti-Induce Campaign Planned, WIRED.COM, Sept. 14, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,64870,00.html; Letter from Ass’n of Am.
Univ. et al, supra note 148; Letter from Gary Shapiro, supra note 148.
151
See Cindy Cohn & Phil Corwin, The Induce Act Would Give Hollywood Veto Power
Over New Technologies, 1 SCITECH LAW. 9, 10 (2005) (“But Hollywood loves remakes,
and the Act is sure to be back once the Supreme Court speaks on Grokster.”).
152
Tony Newmyer, Caution Seen After Court Ruling, ROLL CALL, June 30, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 10297448.
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two statutes: the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 153 and the
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). 154
i. The DMCA
[34] One method by which publishers attempted to gain control over new
technologies was by creating new technology of their own. 155 The
publisher’s technology, however, was designed to prevent users from
engaging in unauthorized dissemination or copying of a copyrighted
work. 156 To achieve this goal, publishers designed technological systems
which encrypted works or restricted access to works, so that consumers
could either only use the works for specific uses or could only access the
work through specific machines. 157 These restrictions enabled publishers
to control new technologies by requiring the new technologies to be
compliant with the protection schemes created by the publishers. 158 For
example, to view Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs), a consumer must
153

17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
Pub. L. 105-298, § 102(b), 102(d), 112 Stat. 2827-28 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302,
304).
155
See PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 270 (2003) (“While technology can make
copying easier and less costly, it can also give content providers the means to more
perfectly restrict access to materials.”); see also Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., An
Unconstitutional Patent in Disguise: Did Congress Overstep Its Constitutional Authority
in Adopting the Circumvention Prevention Provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 33, 51 (2002) (“[T]he ease of infringement and the
difficulty of detection and enforcement would cause copyright owners to look to
technological solutions, in addition to legal solutions, in order to protect their
copyrightable works.”).
156
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 49 (2001) (“Rights management
systems . . . can insist that permission be sought, and a fee paid, for any use.”); see also
BELLIA ET AL., supra note 155, at 270 (“[A]ccess to material on a web site can be
conditioned on paying a fee and (absent hacking) perfectly enforced . . . . [W]hile
technology changes many of the assumptions underlying copyright law, it is far from
clear whether such changes result in an expansion or contraction of control over
content.”).
157
See Burk & Cohen, supra note 156, at 50 (“[C]opyright owners determine the rules
that are embedded into the technological controls.”); see also BELLIA ET AL., supra note
155, at 270 (“For example, a copy-protected compact disc prevents a teacher from
making a copy even if the copyright law might have deemed the copying a fair use.”).
158
See generally Burk & Cohen, supra note 156.
154
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purchase a DVD player that is capable of decoding the regional encoding
on the disc. 159 Furthermore, the player must be equipped with the ability
to properly read and decipher the access codes on the disc. 160 Finally, the
disc itself must contain the proper access codes, or the player will not run
it. 161 Another example can be found in copy-protected compact discs. 162
These discs provide control over computer drives and CD players which
can write to blank discs, by preventing these devices from copying
protected discs – no matter what the purpose for copying the disc. 163
[35] The effectiveness of these technological developments by the
publishing industry has been hampered by the emergence of what has been
termed “the technological arms race.” 164 Three groups of individuals have
resisted the ability of publishers to technologically control their
copyrighted works – would-be infringers, users of works which have
fallen into the public domain, and fair users. 165 None of these groups can
achieve their desired use of the works if technology prevents unauthorized
access or copying of the works. Therefore, these groups responded to the
publishers’ technological achievements by developing their own
technologies which circumvent the publishers’ technologies. 166 Thus, the
publishers became embroiled in a battle of increasingly sophisticated
technology. 167
[36] Publishers did not want to compete in this manner, so they lobbied
Congress to provide statutory enforcement mechanisms for their

159

Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. BUS. L.J.
1, 26-29 (2002).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 21-23.
163
Id.
164
Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217,
251 (“The problem with this scenario is that it constitutes a kind of wasteful ‘arms race’
of technological-protection schemes, with each side increasing its spending to outperform
the other's technology.”).
165
Id. at 250-51.
166
Id.
167
Id.
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technological protections. 168 These efforts resulted in the enactment of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998. 169 The DMCA is
reminiscent of the grant given to the Stationer’s Company in the sixteenth
century. It provides publishers with a mechanism to enforce their
exclusive rights to copyrighted works. Under the DMCA, it is illegal to
circumvent a technological lock on copyrighted works or to manufacture
or distribute any device which is capable of this circumvention. 170 With
this statute as an enforcement mechanism, the publishers won the “arms
race” – technologies which could defeat the publisher’s technologies are
not legal. 171
[37] The DMCA vastly reduces the potential for competition against
publishers. Any challenger who attempts to compete by using a new
technology faces the serious barriers to entry imposed by the statute. New
technology is prohibited if it enables copying of copy-protected works,
whether or not it also can be used for fair uses or to copy non-protected
works or works which are protected but have fallen into the public
domain. 172 Because publishers use their concentrated power to obtain
entire copyrights from authors, any new challenger must negotiate with
the incumbent publishers for rights to any existing work. Although
challengers can compete to obtain copyrights on new works from the
authors, they face numerous obstacles to sustained existence without
access to existing works. First, they will be disadvantaged in the
competition for new works if they cannot copy or distribute existing
works, because they can neither show their effectiveness nor rely on the
168

Under strong lobbying pressure from the middlemen, Congress…
accepted the pay-per-access vision of the future and agreed to shore up
copyright law to deal with the nuances of the digital environment. With
the ostensible goal of bringing United States law into line with an
international treaty, Congress enacted the DMCA.
F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 293, 306 (2001).
169
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
170
Id. §§ 1201(a)(1)(A), 1201(a)(2).
171
See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397,
428-30 (2003); see also Hardy, supra note 164, at 551 (defining the “arms race”
concept).
172
See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 155, at 270 (“For example, a copy-protected compact
disc prevents a teacher from making a copy even if the copyright law might have deemed
the copying a fair use.”); Sharp, supra note 159, at 26-29.
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profitability from old works to support sales of new works. Second, the
incumbents could threaten to withdraw support from old works of authors
if the author sells a copyright to a new copier or distributor. 173 Finally, the
challenger has no established popular works to draw in new works or
customers. Thus, the DMCA greatly diminishes the potential for
competition in the publishing industries.
ii. The CTEA
[38] Since the beginning of the American system of copyright, publishers
have periodically lobbied for extensions in the terms of duration of
copyrights. 174 The CTEA is the latest extension in this series. 175 It
extended the duration of copyright to the life of the author plus seventy
years for works with a determinable author or authors or ninety-five years
for institutional works. 176 In a challenge to the CTEA, the Supreme Court
has recently reaffirmed that extension of the duration is constitutional. 177
From a policy perspective, however, the wisdom of these extensions is
questionable.
[39] The American system of copyright grants copyrights for “limited
times” to provide a check on the monopoly power of copyright owners.178
This check was designed in response to the abuse of monopoly power by
publishers in England, and was intended to prevent a recurrence of the

173

This is similar to a tying theory in antitrust. See Clayton Act § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000)); ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2003).
174
See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572
(extending copyright’s duration to a term of life of the author plus fifty years); Copyright
Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23-24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (term of fifty-six years,
consisting of an additional and a renewal term of twenty-eight years each); Copyright Act
of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (term of forty-two years, consisting of an
original term of twenty-eight years and a renewal term of fourteen years).
175
See The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, §§ 102(b) ,
102(d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828 (extending copyright’s term to life of the author plus seventy
years).
176
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
177
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
178
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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problems that monopoly created. 179 The grant of a limited monopoly to
authors was also provided as an incentive to create works in spite of the
negative effects of giving exclusive control, not as a deliberate grant of
control for the sake of giving control. 180 In light of these purposes, the
policy decision behind extending control over copyrights should be
critically analyzed by Congress, because each extension increases the
monopoly power of copyright holders, even if the duration is still
technically for only a limited time. 181 Because publishers are still able to
obtain the entire copyright in a work from the authors, just as they did in
seventeenth century England, the CTEA and similar previous statutes have
periodically enhanced the monopoly power of the publishers.
IV. STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLISHERS, AUTHORS,
AND THE PUBLIC
[40] The lessons of history, the structure created by the Constitution, and
the provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act all suggest a simple solution to
the problem of publishers’ increasing ability to obtain monopoly power
over creative works. History suggests that monopoly power should be
avoided and is of most concern when held by publishers. 182 The structure
of American copyright law in the Constitution suggests that the primary
beneficiaries of the copyright law should be the consuming public, and
that this benefit should be conferred indirectly by providing direct benefits
to authors for making creative works. Finally, the 1976 Act suggests that
rights to works should vest initially in authors, 183 a “copyright” should

179

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201 n.5 (“The Framers guarded against the future
accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and publishers by authorizing Congress
to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”).
180
Cf. id.
181
See id. at 222 (“Beneath the façade of their inventive constitutional interpretation,
petitioners forcefully urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the
CTEA’s long terms. The wisdom of Congress’ action, however, is not within our
province to second guess.”).
182
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8; see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201 n.5 (“The Framers
guarded against the future accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and
publishers by authorizing Congress to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”).
183
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
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consist of a bundle of individual rights, 184 and each individual right should
be separately transferable. 185
[41] Putting these suggestions together, Congress should recognize an
independent right within a copyright for each new technologically created
method of distributing or copying a work. These rights should initially
vest in the author of the work no matter who owns the other rights to that
work, and these rights should be transferable by the author to any party of
his choosing – whether that party is an owner of some or all of the other
rights in the copyright or not. One caveat to this system is if another party
owns all of the other rights which make up the copyright, that party’s
original expectations in obtaining the copyright should be protected by
granting it a right of first refusal to obtain ownership of the new right on
the same terms as those offered by another potential transferee. The rest
of this section will explore the implications of this solution and discuss the
importance of its implementation to stem the tide of the accrual of
monopoly power by publishers.
A. Benefits and Implications of This Solution
[42] This solution provides a substantial number of benefits, and it incurs
few, if any, serious detriments. Of the four interested groups, authors,
publishers, the public, and technology inventors, three stand to gain from
this solution. The only one who does not stand to benefit, publishers,
would at least still have their interests protected, although they would be
unable to continue to reap rewards at the expense of the other groups. The
solution would also prevent monopoly, thereby respecting the lessons of
history, and it would shift the balance of interests back into equilibrium
for all parties.
[43] The first interested group that would benefit from this solution is
authors. Authors would benefit in a number of ways. First, they would be
the recipient of the newly created rights each time a new technology
related to copying or distributing was developed, and therefore gain more
control over their works. This would give them increased control over
where, when, how, and even whether their works are published, copied,
184
185

Id. § 201(d)(1).
Id. § 201(d)(2).
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and disseminated. Second, this increased control would provide them with
enhanced ability to receive compensation from their works, because they
would have another right to sell.186 This new right corresponds to a new
source of economic value. 187 This right would be assignable separately
from the other rights, either when created for existing works or when the
author initially sells the works for works which are unpublished at the time
of creation of the right. 188 Third, authors would benefit from the removal
of an intermediary in the distribution process. 189 When the right is
automatically assigned to a publisher who controls the copyright, the
publisher typically does not enter into the operation of the new
technology, but licenses that operation to one of its new challengers. This
system provides royalty payments to the publisher from the manufacturer
or operator of the new technology, but it may not provide anything to the
author. If it does provide payments to the author, it likely only provides a
portion of the royalties garnered by the publisher. In laymen’s terms, the
publisher takes a cut which would flow to the author if the author
contracted directly with the manufacturer or operator of the new
technology. Finally, the author would benefit by receiving greater
payments or royalty rates from publishers due to the increased competition
among publishers and the new technology-driven challengers. 190 These
challengers would provide another avenue of copying and/or distribution
to the author, so the author could choose to contract with the publishers or

186

See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (recognizing that the right to
include a freelance author’s manuscript in an online database is a separate right of the
author’s, distinct from the right to publish in a magazine).
187
Id at 497, 508.
188
Id. at 497, 505.
189
See Brian Keith Groemminger, Note, Personal Privacy on the Internet: Should It Be a
Cyberspace Entitlement?, 36 IND. L. REV. 827, 832 (2003) (“The Internet also allows
companies to efficiently deal directly with the ultimate consumer. As a result, a business
can remove many or all of the distribution intermediaries from the chain of distribution,
thereby reducing distribution costs to the business.”).
190
See Hawker, supra note 48, at 448 (“Competition tends to increase economic
efficiency and lower prices.”); Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325 (“Commentators often
advance economic efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust
laws. Free from the restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices,
increases production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business
dealing.”).
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challengers. This increase in competition should drive up the price
obtainable by the author. 191
[44] The second group that would benefit is the public. First, the public
would benefit because this system would not destroy the publishing
industries. Publishers would still be able to realize profits on their
activities, but there would be more incentive for authors to create works.
Increased incentives for authors will assure that the number of new works
is either increased or at least not reduced. New works will still be
available to the public. Second, the public will benefit by virtue of the
same benefits which flow from preventing monopoly power in the
antitrust context: more sources for copying and distributing works, more
competition amongst those sources, and lower prices. 192 Generally,
increased competition leads to lower prices and greater availability of
products, which substantially benefits consumers. 193 Third, the public
would benefit from the continued availability of technologies which would
otherwise be prohibited. 194 Specifically, this benefits people who use
these technologies for legitimate purposes. 195 Finally, the public would
benefit from the increased efficiency that comes with new technology that
191

See Hawker, supra note 48, at 448; Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325.
See ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 169-72
(5th ed. 2003) (discussing consumer loss that results from monopoly overcharge).
193
See supra note 190.
194
Letter from Ass’n of Am. Univ. et al., to Senators Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 17,
2004), available at http://www.educause.edu/LibraryDetailPage/666?ID=CSD3471
(“The Copyright Office’s new draft fails to codify the Supreme Court’s Betamax
decision, which, despite having fostered twenty years of explosive growth in technology,
is now under unrelenting attack.”); Letter from Gary Shapiro, President of Consumer
Electronics Ass’n, et al., to Senators Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/10-6joint_letter_2.pdf (“Unfortunately, the
recording industry continues to propose language that would not solve the piracy
problems in the manner you identified, but instead would effectively put at risk all
consumer electronics, information technology products, and Internet Products and
services that aren’t designed to the industry’s liking.”).
195
See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 155, at 270 (“For example, a copy-protected compact
disc prevents a teacher from making a copy even if the copyright law might have deemed
the copying a fair use.”); see generally, Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent
Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 26-29 (2002).
192
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is more efficient if the creator maintains control over the work rather than
being forced to design the system to avoid maintaining control. It
removes the incentive for inventors to divest themselves of control in
order to avoid secondary liability. 196
[45] Inventors and operators of new technologies would also benefit from
this proposed solution. These parties would be permitted to compete with
established publishers and to realize a profit from their creations, instead
of being forced to pay royalties or forego using their inventions. They
would be given incentives to continue to produce new technologies by
realizing economic remuneration for their inventions. They would be able
to maintain control over their works, instead of being forced to pay
royalties to publishers or abide by limitations on their creations imposed
by the publishers. 197 Finally, they would no longer be subject to a
Hobson’s choice: either subjecting themselves to liability for copyright
infringement or designing their inventions in an inefficient, suboptimal
manner to avoid liability through a lack of control over users. 198
[46] If authors had control over their own works, the incentive would shift
towards maintaining control and creating an efficient system. This shift
would occur as a result of the effect on a number of components in the
overall incentives provided to technology developers and operators. More
control by the developer or operator over the functioning of the system
leads to a more centralized system, which leads to greater traffic by users
at the centralized point of the system, and ultimately to increased profits to
the operator or developer by charging higher prices to, and getting a
greater number of, advertisers. 199 Authors are more likely to be flexible
196

150 CONG. REC. S7178 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“A rule
that punishes only control also acts as a ‘tech-mandate’ law: It mandates the use of
technologies that avoid ‘control’ – regardless of whether they are suited for a particular
task.”).
197
See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
198
See 150 CONG. REC. S7190 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“A
rule that punishes only control also acts as a ‘tech-mandate’ law: It mandates the use of
technologies that avoid ‘control’ – regardless of whether they are suited for a particular
task.”).
199
See Eddan Elizafon Katz, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc. & Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 58 (2001) (“First, content owners
would lose significant advertising revenue from decreased website traffic as a result of
users viewing their downloaded copies rather than streaming the content from the
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with the remuneration structures of their works. 200 Because authors
receive benefits from both sales of copies of their works and from other
sources, 201 such as merchandise, tours, television appearances, or movie
rights, 202 they have greater incentives to allow new distribution
technologies, in particular, to operate for minimal, or even zero,
royalties. 203 Even if authors do charge royalties, developers and operators
would have the option of either paying those royalties out of their income
from advertisements or by charging transaction fees for each download of
that author’s work. Finally, if an author did not grant rights to a particular
copyright owner's website each time they wanted to view it.”); Wei Yanliang & Feng
Xiaoqing, Comments on Cyber Copyright Disputes in the People’s Republic of China:
Maintaining the Status Quo While Expanding the Doctrine of Profit-Making Purposes, 7
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 149, 163 (2003) (“Commercial websites profit from news
and news articles in two ways. First, the gratuitous service of providing online news and
news articles boosts website traffic, thereby increasing advertisement revenue.”); Andrew
L. Dahm, Note, Database Protection v. Deep Linking, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1076 (2004)
(“Many online businesses derive revenue from advertising, so increasing the traffic to a
website increases revenue”).
200
For instance, many authors support free distribution of their work via peer-to-peer
online services. See Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in the
Middle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at 11 (discussing both artists who approve and who
disapprove of online peer-to-peer services and the recording industry’s response);
Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF: Let the Music Play, http://www.eff.org/share/ (last
visited Sept. 19, 2005) (listing a number of artists who support online distribution of their
works).
201
This is an over-simplification. Composers, for example, are artists, but they do not
receive any benefit from sources other than copies sold. Composers could, however,
change their incentive structure through various means, such as contracting for a
percentage of the profits of the recording artists, and they could also get compensation
when their compositions are repeated in new works, such as movies.
202
Of course, movie rights, translations, and other adaptations require the author to have
kept those rights when he initially sold the copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000 &
Supp. 2002).
203
See Peter Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36 U.S.F. L.
REV. 473, 503 (2002) (“Most artists, if they are to earn any income at all, do so through
performances and direct sales of CDs and merchandise.”); Lynn Morrow, The Recording
Artist Agreement: Does It Empower or Enslave?, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 42
(2001) (“[A]n artist can generate further income from sources such as live performances,
television appearances, books, merchandise, and, if the artist is also a songwriter,
increased publishing royalties.”); David Nelson, Note, Free the Music: Rethinking the
Role of Copyright in an Age of Digital Distribution, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 572 n.81
(2005) (“Each additional download will provide an artist with the opportunity to sell their
live shows and merchandise, the main source of income for most musicians.”).
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developer or operator, that entity would have greater success preventing
distribution on their systems of a limited number of authors’ works, as
opposed to vast quantities of works. Thus, this system would reduce the
harmful incentive to produce inefficiency by decentralizing distributing
systems.
[47] Publishers would not benefit from this solution, but they at least
would not be harmed in regards to their pre-existing expectations. By
virtue of the right of first refusal, the publisher would be able to obtain the
new right on terms no less favorable than those offered to its potential
competitors. 204 Therefore, the publisher would still have access to this
right, so that its reliance in having all of the rights to a work when it
purchased the copyright would not be undermined, but the author would
still be able to obtain the competitive level of remuneration for that right.
Additionally, publishers would be able to negotiate for the additional right
in all future contracts.
[48] Finally, the copyright system as a whole would benefit from this
solution. The balance of power would shift back to an equilibrium point.
Authors would continue to create new works and would have access to old
works, the public would have new works available to purchase, publishers
would be able to make a profit based on a competitive market, and new
technologies would still be developed. Publishers would no longer be able
to quickly and easily gain monopoly power because they would face
increased competition from new technology developers and operators.
Publishers would also be forced to respond to new technologies, instead of
fighting against them, which would lead to greater efficiency and
competitiveness by the existing publishers. 205
204

A right of first refusal means that when the owners decide to sell the
property, the person named has the first chance to buy it. A right of
first refusal or preemptive right does not give to the preemptioner the
power to compel an unwilling owner to sell; it merely requires the
owner, when and if he decides to sell, to offer the property first to the
person entitled to the preemption.
Willson v. Terry, 874 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Mont. 1994).
205
See Hawker, supra note 48, at 448 (“Competition tends to increase economic
efficiency and lower prices.”); Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325 (“Commentators often
advance economic efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust
laws. Free from the restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices,
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B. Changing the Path of Copyright by Implementing this Solution
[49] The current course of copyright litigation and legislation shows a
marked preference for promoting publisher control and power over
copyrighted works. Publishers are larger and more concentrated than
authors, the public, or even technology developers. 206 Therefore, they are
able to require the transferal of copyrights from authors prior to agreeing
to publish an author’s work. This system has its benefits. All parties to
copyrights rely on and benefit each other in some way, so the continued
vitality of publishers is important. This does not mean, however, that
publishers should be able to obtain monopoly power over copyrights. 207
Even worse would be a situation where publishers were assisted through
public policy in obtaining monopolies. Yet, the current trend in copyright
law seems to be headed in precisely this direction. Congress has seen fit
to continue to lengthen the duration of copyrights, 208 and it has protected
publisher actions designed to increase their control over works. 209
Congress has also contemplated legislative reversal of one of the largest
obstacles to publisher acquisition of monopoly power. 210 Courts too have
demonstrated a preference for publishers, by narrowing the holding of the
Sony case and by imposing liability on technology developers and
increases production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business
dealing.”).
206
See Marci A. Hamilton, Perspective on Direct Democracy: The People: The Least
Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, *5 (1997) (“Granting copyright
to authors was motivated by the understanding that publishers are more likely to become
holders of concentrated power than are authors.”); Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing
Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 44-45 (2002) (“[A]n increasingly
concentrated industry of publishers routinely own the copyright for a work outright and
therefore have an incentive to lobby for ever-expanding copyright terms.”).
207
See Hawker, supra note 48, at 448 (“Competition tends to increase economic
efficiency and lower prices.”); Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325 (“Commentators often
advance economic efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust
laws. Free from the restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices,
increases production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business
dealing.”).
208
See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, § 102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 282728 (1999) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304).
209
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub.L. 105-304, Title I, § 103(a), 112 Stat.
2863 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201-1205 (2000)).
210
See Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
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operators. This pattern should be halted and reversed if an equitable
balance of interests in copyrights and proper distribution of incentives are
to be achieved.
[50] This solution effectively accomplishes these goals. First, it would
maintain the Sony decision, so technologies such as VCRs, DVD players,
cassette players, and CD players would remain safe and legal. However,
if the current trend continues, the Induce Act will eventually be enacted,
and these technologies will generate liability in their manufacturers. This
would harm not only the manufacturers, but also the consuming public,
authors, and publishers themselves. For example, in the VCR context, the
home video industry has become huge, generating billions in profits every
year. 211 The video industry provides income to the publishers, to authors
who sell copies of their works, and to the manufacturers of the electronics
used to watch those copies. It also benefits the public, by allowing them
to watch movies and television in the comfort of their own homes and in a
medium and at times other than just those provided by broadcast television
or movie theaters. 212
[51] Second, this solution would transfer control to authors from
publishers, and strike a more appropriate balance of the interests and
incentives in copyright. 213 Authors would be able to choose what uses of
their works to permit and to withhold in relation to new technologies.
Instead of this choice being given to publishers, who can use that choice to
take over an infant industry in its inception, authors can utilize that
nascent industry to enhance competition amongst publishers to the benefit
of authors and the public alike. For example, in the online peer-to-peer
distribution systems, authors can choose whether to allow their works to
be freely downloaded, to charge royalties for their works, or to withhold

211

See Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004:Hearing on S.2560 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Gary J. Shapiro, President and
Chief Exec. Officer, Consumer Electronics Association); Huver, supra note 118.
212
Another example would be the application of the Induce Act to musical recordings
and cassette and CD players.
213
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (1976); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 n.5 (2003) (“The Framers guarded
against the future accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and publishers by
authorizing Congress to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”).
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permission to download. 214 Therefore, instead of allowing publishers to
withhold permission across the board and to then enter the online
distribution market themselves, it forces publishers to compete with the
original online distributors. Publishers would not be able to withhold
rights from sources they do not control, such as Napster and Grokster, in
an effort to promote sales from vendors who pay royalties to the publisher,
regardless of the desires of authors or the ultimate effect on authors,
publishers, technology developers, and the consuming public. 215 Instead,
authors would be able to choose whether, for what price (if any), and to
whom permission to distribute their work online would be granted. Artists
who like the concept of Napster and Grokster could continue to
disseminate their work via those services. These services would only run
into a problem with artists who refuse to permit online distribution of their
works. 216 For these authors, the services could either find a way to
prevent downloading or face liability for infringement. Both publishers
and challengers would be able to operate online distribution programs,
they would just be forced to compete for the rights to distribute each
author’s works. Authors would also still be able to impose liability on
direct infringers, even if they failed to impose liability on an alleged
secondary infringer.
[52] Finally, this system would enhance the ability of authors to recognize
each individual right that composes the bundle of rights in a copyright. As
the law currently stands, authors generally receive little, if any, additional
benefit for each additional right conveyed to a publisher 217 because the
214

See Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in the Middle, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at 1 (discussing both artists who approve and who disapprove of
online peer-to-peer services and the recording industry’s response); File-Sharing: It’s
Music to our Ears, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/share
(listing a number of artists who support online distribution of their works) (last visited
Nov. 14, 2005).
215
Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (recognizing a right in the artist to
control the publication of his or her work in online databases).
216
For artists who wanted royalty payments, the service could use a portion of its
advertising revenues, even if it did not charge users for use of its services. See, e.g.,
Artists Uncertain About File Sharing, CREATIVE LIBRARIAN, Sept. 17, 2003,
http://creativelibrarian.com/364/artists-uncertain-about-file-sharing (providing examples
of artists, such as Metallica, who do not want their files distributed for free).
217
See generally, Mitchell, supra note 6 (discussing the publisher’s ability to require an
author to transfer any newly recognized rights without any additional benefits); Amy
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publisher has enough power to force the author to convey all rights in a
work prior to agreeing to publish the work. 218 If alternate sources were
available to the author for selling the rights (i.e., if there was greater
competition amongst publishers) the authors would have greater leverage
for refusing to convey each right to a publisher. 219 An author could rely
on his ability to sell the individual distribution right to an online
distributor and refuse to sell the entire bundle of rights to a publisher. In
essence, because the author could choose to distribute their work solely
through the online distributor, the publisher would have less coercive
power to obtain the entire copyright. 220 Thus, authors would have greater
leverage to negotiate with publishers and would thereby be able to receive
greater remuneration, and increased incentives, for creating their works. 221
With the reward of additional compensation as an incentive, authors
would create either the same number or possibly more works, which
would be distributed to more consumers at the same or lower prices
because of the increased competition amongst publishers and distributors.
When one focuses on the direct benefit through copyrights to authors
created by the Copyright Clause, the incentives to create new works
emerge as the ultimate goal. Therefore, the ultimate beneficiary is the
consuming public. This result appears to be the one mandated by the
Constitution. 222

Terry, Note, Tasini Aftermath: The Consequences of the Freelancers’ Victory, 14
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 231, 236 (2004) (“The freelancers’ landmark victory in
Tasini has proved to be empty of any actual concrete benefit to freelancers.”).
218
See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218 (1990) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at
14 (1909)) (“It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a
publisher for a comparatively small sum.”); see also Mitchell, supra note 6, at 526-27
(discussing the publisher’s ability to require an author to transfer any newly recognized
rights without any additional benefits); Terry, supra note 217, at 236 (“The freelancers’
landmark victory in Tasini has proved to be empty of any actual concrete benefit to
freelancers.”).
219
See Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325 (“Commentators often advance economic
efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust laws. Free from the
restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices, increases
production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business dealing.”).
220
See id.
221
See id.
222
Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 n.5 (2003) (“The Framers guarded against
the future accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and publishers by authorizing
Congress to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”).
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[53] If one focuses on the structure and language of the Copyright Clause,
compensation to and incentives for publishers do not appear. Instead, the
direct benefit provided to authors causes the incentive to create new works
to emerge as the immediate goal. However, the limitations placed on
authors' rights demonstrate that the ultimate beneficiary is meant to be the
consuming public. Thus, the result achieved by this solution---the
provision of benefits to the public---appears to be the one mandated by the
Constitution.
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